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The Right to Evidence 
BENNETT L. GERSHMAN* 
White Plains 
ALTHOUGH ITS theoretical basis 
may be disputed, nobody questions 
the proposition that a person charg-
ed with a crime has a constitutional 
right to present a defense,1 Present-
ing a defense naturally requires ac-
cess to proof. Access includes not 
only the availability of evidence, 
but also its permissible use. Con-
sider some examples: A defendant 
wants to testify, but his lawyer's 
threats drive him off the stand. A 
witness who might be expected to 
give favorable testimony for the de-
fense appears at trial but refuses to 
testify. A defense witness wants to 
testify, but because the defendant 
failed to notify the prosecutor about 
the witness, is precluded from giv-
ing such proof. Evidence that might 
exculpate a defendant has been sup-
pressed by the prosecutor, or has 
been lost or destroyed by the police. 
The evidence in all of these cases as 
a practical matter is inaccessible to 
support the defense. Does the defen-
dant have any remedy? This article 
discusses the types of evidence that 
theoretically are accessible to a 
defendant, some of the practical and 
legal barriers that can obstruct a 
defendant's access to such proof, 
and the constitutional protections 
afforded a defendant if access is im-
permissibly denied .. 
A defendant supposedly has 
broad, constitutionally-guaranteed 
access to evidence to prove his de-
fense. Some of this evidence may be 
in the defendant's possession or 
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under his control. He has a constitu-
tional right, derived from several 
constitutional sources, to give the 
fad-finder his own testimony.2 He 
also has the right under the sixth 
amendment's compulsory processs 
clause to require the appearance of 
any witness to give testimony. 3 If 
the defendant is an indigent and if a 
proper showing is made, he has ac-
cess at government expense to in-
vestigative and expert assistance 
and testimony. 4 
Some evidence, although in the 
prosecutor's possession and control, 
may also be accessible to a defen-
dant. Prosecution witnesses, assum-
ing they are known by the defense, 
can be interviewed before trialS and 
cross-examined during trial. 6 
Discovery rules enable a defendant 
to examine before trial a broad ar-
ray of tangible evidence.7 Also ac-
cessible is any materially exculpa-
tory information in the prosecutor's 
possession.8 Given the variety of 
evidentiary and procedural safe-
guards surrounding the fact-finding 
process, and assuming unobstructed 
access to evidence, our adversary 
system might be expected to pro-
duce reliable and fair results. Such is 
often not the case, however. Bar-
riers exist that obstruct a 
defendant's access to proof. 
Although common law rules dis-
qualifying a defendant from testify-
ing have been abolished,9 restric-
tions upon the defendant's own tes-
timony exist. Relevancy and relia-
bility considerations limit a defen-
dant's ability to offer his own testi-
mony. If reasonable, such restric-
tions probably will be upheld. In 
Nix v. Whiteside,lO for example, a 
defendant was prevented from testi-
fying when his attorney threatened 
to expose anticipated falsehoods. 
No constitutional right of the defen-
dant was infringed, the Supreme 
Court concluded, because although 
a defendant has a right to testify, he 
has no right to testify falsely, nor a 
right to the assistance of an attorney 
to abet that plan. In a close decision, 
the Court recently struck down a 
ruling by a state court restricting on 
reliability grounds a defendant's 
hypnotically-refreshed testimony. 
In Rock v. Arkansas,l1 the defen-
dant underwent hypnosis to refresh 
her memory about the details of her 
shooting her husband. She sought to 
testify to facts she remembered as a 
result of the hypnosis but the court 
would not permit her testimony, 
concluding that hypnotically re-
freshed testimony was inherently 
unreliable and therefore per se inad-
missible. The Supreme Court held 
this to be constitutional error. 
Although a state may impose rea-
sonable restrictions on the presenta-
tion of evidence, the Courtrtoted, 
the absolute barring of a defendant's 
post-hypnotic testimony was "ar-
bitrary and disproportionate" to the 
purposes behind the state's eviden-
tiary safeguards,12 The testimony 
could have been restricted had the 
• Professor of Law, Pace University .. 
1 Compare Westen, The Co/Jipulsory Pro-
cess Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 127-131 
(1974) (Compulsory Process Clause as basis 
for the right to present a defense) with Clin-
ton, The Right to Present a Defense: An 
Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in 
Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REV. 713, 793 
(1976) (spirit and history of Bill of Rights as 
basis for such right). 
2 Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2709 
(1987); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 
819 n. 15 (1975); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 
273 (1948). But see People v. Washington, 71 
N.Y. 2d 916,521 N.Y.S. 2d 531,523 N.E. 2d 
818 (1988). 
3 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 
(1967); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 107. S. Ct. 
989(1987). But see People v. Gisendanner, 48 
N.Y. 2d 543,423 N.Y.S. 2d 893,399 N.E. 2d 
925 (1979). 
4 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). See 
N.Y. County Law § 722-C. 
S United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 
(1975). 
6 Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); 
Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931). 
7 Fed R. Crim. P. 16; N.Y. Crim. Proc. L. 
art. 240. 
8 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); 
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 
9 Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 
573-582 (1961). 
10 475 U.S. 157 (1986). 
11 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987). 
12 Id. at 2711. 
NEW YORK STATE BAR JOURNAL NOVEMBER 1989 
HeinOnline -- 61 N.Y. St. B.J. 53 1989
lower court made specific, case-
related findings of unreliability. 
A defendant has a constitutional 
right of access to the testimony of 
defense witnesses unimpeded by ar-
bitrary barriers. In Washington v. 
Texas,B for example, the Supreme 
Court struck down a statute that 
prevented persons charged as ac-
complices from testifying for one 
another. By preventing a defendant 
from access to his accomplice's testi-
mony, the Court observed, "the 
State arbitrarily denied him the 
right to put on the stand a witness 
who was physically and mentally 
capable of testifying to events that 
he had personally observed, and 
whose testimony would have been 
relevant and material to the 
defense."14 However, preclusion of 
the testimony of a defense witness as 
a sanction for his attorney's failure 
to comply with a pretri(l.l discovery 
request by the prosecutor did not in-
fringe upon the defendant's consti-
tution(l.l right to compulsory process 
or due process. In Taylor v. 
Illinois,15 the Supreme Court helq 
that barring defense evidence, 
although a "drastic" sanction, is ap-
propriate when the discovery viola-
tion is "willful and blatant" and 
"motivated by a desire to obtain a 
tactical advantage that would mini-
mize the effectiveness of cross-
examination and the ability to ad-
duce rebuttal evidence."16 Here the 
Court visited the sins of defense 
counsel \lpon the client, depriving 
the latter of evidence that might 
have exonerated him. 
Rules of evidence may deny a 
def~ndant access to relevant witness 
testimony. In Chambers v. Missis-
sippi,17 the state's hearsay rule 
coupled with its "voucher(' rule pre-
vented a defendant charged with 
murder from introducing testimony 
from a witness who previously had 
confessed to the killing. Since there 
was no showing that the proposed 
testimony was unreliable, applying 
the above rules of evidence to deny 
the defendant access to this exculpa-
tory testimony was held to be fun-
damentally unfair' and a denial of 
due process. Had these archaic rules 
not been so skewed against the 
defendant, the result probably 
would have been different. Similar-
ly, a defendant was denied the right 
to confront his accuser when he was 
prevented from using confidential 
juvenile court records to cross-
examine the prosecution's principal 
witness. Defense access to such in-
formation, the Supreme Court held 
in Davis v. Alaska,18 was para-
mount to the state's policy of pro-
tecting j\lvenile offenders from em-
barrassment caused by' such 
disclosure. 
Testimonial privileges may also 
deny a defendant access to crucial 
proof to support his defense. In 
Roviaro v. United States,19 the pros-
ecutor's refusal to disclose to the 
defense the identity of an under-
cover informer who had taken a ma-
terial part in a narcotics investiga-
tion denied the defendant a fair 
trial. The Supreme Court held: 
"Where the disclosure of an in-
former's identity, or of the contents 
of his communication, is relevant 
and helpful to the defense of an ac-
cused, or is essential to a fair deter-
mination of a cause, the privilege 
must give way. "20 However, not all 
claims of privilege can be overrid-
den to provide a defendant access to 
proof. A witness's assertion of the 
privilege against self-incrimination 
to refuse to testify for a defendant, 
for instance, might not constitute an 
impermissible denial of proof. 21 
Although this is a controversial sub-
ject, the courts generally do not re-
quire a prosecutor to confer im-
munity on a witness in order to pro-
vide a defendant access to such testi-
mony.22 On the other hand, judicial 
threats or other governmental con-
duct that induces a defense witness 
to refuse to testify can unconstitu-
tionally deny a defendant access to 
evidence. Such was the case in 
Webb v. Texas,23 where the trial 
judge's strong admonition to the 
sole defense witness against commit-
ting perjury "effectively drove the 
NEW YORK STATE BAR JOURNAL NOVEMBER 1989 
witness off the stand," thereby 
abridging the defendant's due pro-
cess right to a fair trial. 24 
Absent some showing of materi-
ality, however, the denial of access 
to witnesses probably will be up-
held. InUnited States v. Valenzuela-
Bernal,25 the prosecutor immediate-
ly deported eyewitnesses to the 
defendant's crime without affording 
defense counsel an opportunity to 
interview them. The Supreme Court 
rejected the claim that this conduct 
unconstitutionally infringed upon 
the defendant's access to evidence. 
The defendant cannot establish a 
constitutional violation, the Court 
said, without "some plausible show-
ing of how [the witnesses'] 
testimony would have been both 
material and favorable to the 
defense."26 Since the defendant did 
not show any specific prejudice, no 
constitutional violation was 
demonstrated. 
Different and complex problems 
are presented by the prosecutor's 
13 388 U.S. 14 (1967). 
14 Id. at 23. 
15 108 S. Ct. 646 (1988). 
16 Id, at 655. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12 (court 
authorized to exclude testimony of undisclos-
ed alibi witness). See also Note, The Preclu-
sion Sanction - A Violation of the Right to 
Present a Defense, 81 YALE L. J. 1342 (1972). 
17 410 U.S. 284 (1973). 
18 415 U.S. 308 (1974). 
19 353 U.S. 53 (1957). 
20 Id. at 60-61. See also United States v. Nix-
on, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (executive privilege); 
Matte.r of Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A. 2d 330 
(1978) (reporter's privilege). Hut see People v. 
Tissois, 72 N.Y. 2d 75, 531 N.Y.S. 2d 228, 
526 N.E. 2d 1086 (1988) (Social worker 
privilege). 
21 United States v. Turkish, 623 F. 2d 769 (2d 
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981); 
United States v. Bowling, 666 F. 2d 1052 (6th 
Cir. 1981). 
22 See Gershman, The Prosecutor's Obliga-
tion to Grant Defense Witness Immunity, 24 
CRIM. L. BULL. 14 (1988). 
23 409 U.S. 95 (1972). 
24 Id. at 98. Prosecutorial conduct alsQ can 
interfere with a defendant's right to present 
witnesses. See B. Gershman, PROSECU-
TORIAL MISCONDUCT § 9.10(b) (1985). 
25 458 U.S. 858 (1982). 
26 Id. at 867. 
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denial to the defense of access to ex-
culpatory evidence. A rule of con-
stitutional materiality has devel-
oped whereby suppressed evidence 
is measured by the extent of its pre-
judice to the defendant's ability to 
present his defense. To be sure, 
there is no constitutional require-
ment that a prosecutor disclose to 
the defense all investigatory work 
done on a case,27 nor is there a rule 
obligating a prosecutor to disclose 
his entire file to defense counsel,28 
By the same token, the landmark 
case of Brady v. Maryland29 held 
that a prosecutor is duty-bound to 
disclose to the defense materially fa-
vorable evidence. "Evidence is ma-
terial," the Supreme Court stated in 
United States v. Bagley,30 "if there is 
a reasonable probability that had 
the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different." Deny-
ing a defendant access to such proof 
violates due process regardless of 
the prosecutor's good or bad faith. 31 
The legal analysis here focuses on 
the character of the evidence, not of 
the prosecutor. 
When a defendant is denied ac-
cess to evidence because such evi-
dence is no longer available, dif-
ferent considerations come into play 
as practical concerns clash with con-
stitutional doctrine. As a threshold 
matter, the prosecutor's duty to dis-
close exculpatory information gen-
erally includes the obligation to 
preserve such evidence from loss or 
destruction. 32 Illustrative of such 
evidence are destroyed handwritten 
notes of interviews with witnesses,33 
erased videotapes or sound record-
ings,34 lost blood, sperm, urine, or 
other scientific evidence,35 and unre-
tained items found at the crime 
scene.36 If no constitutional duty ex-
isted, the disclosure requirement 
under Brady v. Maryland would be 
an empty formality that could be 
"easily circumvented by suppression 
of evidence by means of destruction 
rather than mere failure to reveal."37 
In contrast to the suppression of ex-
culpatory evidence, the prosecutor's 
54 
good or bad faith in making evi-
dence inaccessible becomes critical. 
The Supreme Court in two re-
cent cases has addressed the prose-
cutor's responsibility to preserve ex-
culpatory evidence for access by a 
defendant. In California v. Trom-
betta,38 the Supreme Court address-
ed for the first time the prosecutor's 
responsibility to preserve favorable 
evidence for the defendant's later 
use. In Trombetta, law enforcement 
officials destroyed breath samples 
taken from the defendant and used 
in his prosecution for intoxicated 
driving. The California appeals 
court reversed the conviction, find-
ing that the failure to preserve 
evidence used against the defendant 
violated due process. The Supreme 
Court disagreed. Although a duty to 
preserve evidence was not ruled out, 
"that duty must be limited to evi-
dence that might be expected to play 
a significant role in the suspect's 
defense." To meet this standard of 
materiality, the Court concluded, 
the evidence "must both possess an 
exculpatory value that was apparent 
before the evidence was destroyed, 
and be of such a nature that the 
defendant would be unable to ob-
tain comparable evidence by other 
reasonably available means."39 
Last Term, in Arizona v. Young-
blood,40 the Court considered the 
applicable constitutional standard 
when the state fails to preserve 
evidence that might be useful to a 
defendant. The lost evidence in 
Youngblood was clothing worn by 
the victim of a sexual attack con-
taining semen stains which the po-
lice failed to refrigerate and there-
fore preserve for subsequent testing. 
The Arizona Supreme Court re-
versed the conviction on the ground 
that the prosecution had breached 
its constitutional duty to preserve 
the semen samples so that timely 
testing could have been performed, 
possibly resulting in the complete 
exoneration of the defendant. The 
problem in Youngblood, as in 
Trombetta, was the absence of the 
evidence, thereby requiring courts 
to "face the treacherous task of 
divining the import of materials 
whose contents are unknown and, 
very often, disputed."41 Given this 
speculative task of measuring preju-
dice-not the case where exculpato-
ry evidence has been suppress-
ed-the Court held that "unless a 
criminal defendant can show bad 
faith on the part of the police, 
failure to preserve potentially useful 
evidence does not constitute a denial 
of due process of law."42 Since there 
was no suggestion of bad faith on 
the part of the Arizona police in los-
ing this evidence, denying the defen-
dant access to such proof was con-
stitutionally of no significance. 
27 Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795 
(1972). 
28 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111 
(1976). 
29 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See also People v. 
Cwikla, 46 N.Y. 2d 434,414 N.Y.S. 2d 102, 
386 N.E. 2d 1070 (1979). 
30 473 U.S. 667 (1985). 
31 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 87. 
32 California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 
488 (1984). 
33 Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231 
(1961); United States v. Harrison, 524 F. 2d 
421 (D.C. Cir. 1975); People v. Paranzino, 40 
N.Y. 2d 1005,391 N.Y.S. 2d 391, 359N.E. 2d 
981 (1976). 
34 United States v. Bryant, 439 F. 2d 642 
(D.C. Cir. 1971); People v. Springer, 122 
A.D. 2d 87, 504 N.Y.S. 2d 232 (2d Dept. 
1986); People v. Saddy, 84 A.D. 2d 175, 445 
N.Y.S. 2d 601 (2d Dept. 1981). 
35 Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. 333 
(1988) (semen samples); California v. Trom-
betta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) (breath samples); 
Colon v. Kuhlman, 865 F. 2d 29 (2d Cir. 
1988) (semen); People v. Allgood, 70 N.Y. 2d 
812, 523 N.Y.s. 2d 431, 517 N.E. 2d 1316 
(1987) ("rape kit"). 
36 People v. Kelly, 62 N.Y. 2d 514, 478 
N.Y.S. 2d 834,467 N.E. 2d 498 (1984); Peo-
ple v. Morgan, 199 Colo. 237, 606 P. 2d 1296 
(1980); State v. Oliverez, 34 are. App. 417, 
578 P. 2d 502 (1978); People v. Brown, 194 
Colo. 553, 574 P. 2d 92 (1978). 
37 United States v. Bryant, 439 F. 2d at 648. 
38 467 U.S. 479 (1984). 
39 Id. at 489. 
40 109 S. Ct. 333 (1988). 
41 California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 486. 
42 Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. at 337. 
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Arizona v. Youngblood is an ex-
tremely troubling decision. Cases 
involving lost or destroyed evidence 
present factors that complicate the 
appropriate standard of review, and 
courts must balance these factors 
against the "over-riding concern 
with the justice of the finding of 
guilt."43 The first complicating fac-
tor relates to the nonexistence of the 
evidence. Because the evidence is 
not available, it is virtually impossi-
ble to measure its exculpatory quali-
ty and its probable impa~t on the 
jury. Courts therefore mt).st specu-
late on the exculpatory character 
and materiality of such evidence in 
weighing the appropriate sanction. 
In assessing materiality, some courts 
require the defendant to prove that 
the evidence would have been excul-
patory.44 After Arizona v. Young-
blood, however, it is questionable 
whether showing that the evidence 
is exculpatory even matters, if it 
cannot also be demonstrated that 
the prosecutor or police acted in bad 
faith in losing or destroying the 
evidence. This standard can pro-
duce serious miscarriages of 
justice.45 Just as with other stan-
dards recently imposed by the Su-
preme Court on police or prosecu-
torial behavior, showing bad faith 
destruction seems virtually imp os-
sible.46 Of course, the circumstances 
of the loss or destruction might raise 
a strong inference of bad faith. 47 
Moreover, what does "bad faith loss 
or destruction" rea,lly mean? Does it 
mean a willful destruction in order 
to intentionally prejudice a defen-
dant's rights? Or can reckless or 
grossly negligent behavior suffice to 
meet the pad faith test? Oth~r 
Supreme Court decisions applying 
"bad faith" language are equally hn-
precise as to its meaning.48 It should 
be noted that state courts are not re-
quired to follow this "bad faith" 
Youngblood test, but can impose on 
prosecutorial and police conduct 
much more stringent standards.49 
Another compJicating factor in 
cases of lost evidence is the nature of 
the sanction to be imposed. Where-
as under Brady a court can remand 
for a new trial in which the sup-
pressed evidence can be produced, 
such relief is meaningless where 
crucial evidence is permanently un-
available. The choice in such cases 
often is between affirmance and 
dismissal, whkh may explain the 
Supreme Court's decision in Young-
blood to opt for such a restrictive 
standard. Since dismissal is the most 
extreme sanction, lesser sanctions 
might be adopted, such as excluding 
the particular item of prosecution 
evidence to which the lost evidence 
relates, 50 or giving the jury an ap-
propriate limiting instruction. 51 
IronicCilly, under the standard in 
Youngblood, courts could affirm a 
conviction involving lost evidence 
even though the nondisclosure of 
that same evidence might under the 
Brady v. Maryland standard require 
a new trial. 
In sum, although a defendant 
has a right to present a defense, 
gaining access to evidence to prove 
that defense may be futile. As we 
have seen, constitutional protec-
tions for access to evidence often are 
nonexistent or of limited utility. The 
aspiration of our adversary system 
to be a Search for the Truth theoreti-
cally may be attainable, but practi-
cally may be a mirage. 
43 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112. 
44 State v. Oliverez, supra. 
45 See Colon v. Kuhlman, supra (valuable 
evidence destroyed which, if preserved, could 
have absolved defendant). 
46 Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982) 
(need to show prosecutor's intent to goad 
defense attorney into seeking mistrial); 
UnitedStates v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977) 
(need to show prosecutor intentionally 
delayed charging defendant to gain tactical 
advantage or for harassment purposes); 
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) 
(need to show prosecutor brought charges 
because defendants were asserting their 
rights). 
47 See Hilliard v. Spalding, 719 F. 2d 1443 
(9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Pollock, 417 
F. Supp.1332 (D. Mass. 1976); People v. 
Springer, supra; People v. Harmes, 38 Colo. 
App. 378, 560 P. 2d 470 (1976). 
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48 See e.g., United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 
600, 611 (1976). 
49 See Brennan, State Constitutions and the 
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. 
REV. 489 (1977). See also People v. Isaacson, 
44 N.Y. 2d 511,406 N.Y.S. 2d 714, 378 N.E. 
2d 78 (1978). 
50 People v. Morgan, 199 Colo. 237, 606 P. 
2d 1296 (1980); State v. Oliverez, 34 Ore. 
App. 417, 578 P. 2d 502 (1978); People v. 
Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641,527 P. 2d 361,117 Cal. 
Rptr. 9 (1974). 
51 Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. at 335; 
U.S. v. Quiover, 539 F. 2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 
1976). 
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